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Tourism border-making:  
A political economy of China’s border tourism  
Abstract: 
This paper identifies changes in borderland tourism and their bordering consequences 
on the Daluo-Mongla border in Xishuangbanna, China. It identifies three distinctive 
phases: (a) phase one (1991-2001)- rapid growth of organized cross-border tourist flow, 
(b) phase two (2002-2011)- stagnation and collapse of formal tourism sector yet 
emerging illegal cross-border tourist flow, and (c) phase three (2012-present)- 
resurrection and transition of border tourism. It illustrates the border-making agency of 
tourism, arguing tourism development at the border can be viewed as a re-bordering 
force. It analyzes an evolutionary process of changing power structures, namely a 
dominant control of local states and market forces, a partial power shift towards 
national state and border communities, and a new dominance by the Chinese state.  
Keywords: tourism, bordering, ethnographic approach, ethnic minorities. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
Borders are traditionally regarded as barriers for tourism, for they were originally 
constructed for the purpose of producing barriers to human interaction and mobilities 
including the flow of people, goods, services, and ideas between countries (Weidenfeld, 
2013). They served to mark patterns of judicial authorities and identities to formulate 
differences between peoples. Yet in an era of globalization, borders are now viewed 
more frequently as bridges enabling contact, communication, openness and 
collaboration (Johnson et al., 2011; Newman, 2006). Against such a backdrop, tourism 
has emerged in many borderlands worldwide (Gelbman & Timothy, 2017). Notably, 
given the complex, typically interstitial, liminal character of border zones, border 
tourism constitutes a distinct intermediary type of tourism, neither domestic nor 
international (Askew & Cohen, 2004).  
It is suggested that to understand China it is necessary to understand policies relating 
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to its borders. China is the “Middle Kingdom” – hence its cultural vision and the very 
calligraphic denoting China represents a country where borders have significance 
(Jacques, 2012). For centuries China sought to protect its borders as lines of 
demarcation between the civilized and non-civilized worlds – today borders are 
embedded in broad socio-economic and political contexts (Megoran, 2012; Timothy, 
Saarinen, & Viken, 2016). Borders are thus not given, but socially made and continually 
remade by multi-scalar actors in evolving contexts, during which power struggles are 
unavoidable (Scott, 2015)  .  
 
To this end, the bordering process is thus inextricably interweaved with tourism 
development on the border (Novak, 2016). Yet, due to a static view of borders as “lines” 
of states in tourism scholarship (Timothy et al., 2016), the tourism and bordering nexus 
remains almost unexplored (Rowen, 2014). While the case focuses on the Yunnan 
Myanmar border region, for the most part the Central State policies noted refer to the 
whole of China and processes similar to those of Yunnan can be found in Xinjiang, 
Tibet, and Gansu for example. 
 
From this aspect, the political economy of tourism development at the border appears 
a potential means of analysis. “Political economy comprises the study of the socio-
economic forces and power relations that are constituted in the process of the 
production of commodities for the market and the divisions, conflicts and inequalities 
that arise from this” (Bianchi, 2018, p. 88). Within a political economy approach, the 
social system is considered to constitute a whole, all aspects of which are viewed as 
interconnected with the broad economic and political environment (Jessop, 2008). This 
approach emphasizes how economic and political conditions shape power relationships 
among actors, and thus contributes to understanding how the development of tourism 
at destinations involves highly politicized power relations among multiple stakeholders, 
each of whom seeks to shape the tourism system in their favor (Stoffelen, Ioannides, & 
Vanneste, 2017), and further the social consequences of tourism. Hence the political 
economy of border tourism development can facilitate the identification of the multi-
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scalar and power-infused social processes that shape borders and, at the same time, are 
shaped by borders.     
 
This study assesses the development of tourism bordering within the distinctive socio-
political and economic circumstances of China. These have driven tourism 
development since the “Opening-up”, including a gradualist approach to 
transition/transformation, the re-birth of entrepreneurship and the market economy, 
structural change and the retention but evolution of governance by the Chinese 
Communist Party (Sofield & Li, 2011). During the late 1980s and early 1990s, China 
signed a number of agreements with neighboring countries to promote border tourism 
development for peoples on both sides of the borderlands, which has now been at an 
“integrated” development stage as envisioned by the national strategy (Ge, Xi, & Wang, 
2014). Nonetheless, empirical studies of tourism at China’s borders remain relatively 
few despite significant policy actions over the last 40 years (Li & Shu, 2015). Taking 
the Daluo-Mongla border in China’s Xishuangbanna as a case study, this paper seeks 
to comprehend the complexity of socio-economic and political changes accompanying 
China’s border tourism development and its consequences over a period of nearly 30 
years. In doing so it highlights border tourism in areas of ethnic minority populations. 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
Border, bordering, and tourism  
The role of border in tourism has generally been well investigated, including borders 
as destinations and attractions, impediments, landscape modifiers, and spaces of transit 
(Timothy, 2001; Timothy et al., 2016). According to Timothy (2001), tourist attractions 
related to borders and border areas include, but are not limited to, border-themed 
attractions, heritage tourism, vice (e.g., gambling, prostitution), natural attractions and 
international parks, shopping, political and socio-cultural difference across the border 
etc. Therefore, tourism activities and attractions can be diverse within and across 
borderlands, yet “in essence, they pertain to the border existence or demonstrate a 
conceptual relationship between them and the border” (Mansfeld & Korman, 2015, p. 
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437). Thus, as Mansfeld and Korman (2015) point out, the term “border tourism” 
should be adopted as an umbrella term covering all borderland tourism types and 
attractions established as a result of the existence of and in relation to the border. Border 
tourism (bianjing lvyou), however, as defined by the Chinese central government, 
requires travel agencies to be licensed. This permits them to serve Chinese citizens and 
citizens of neighboring countries to collectively cross borders at appointed “border 
ports” (bianjing kou’an) in accordance with regulations pertaining to travel within 
defined areas and time limits as agreed by bilateral government agreements (China 
National Tourism Administration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Public 
Security, & General Administration of Customs, 1997). Therefore, Mansfeld and 
Korman’s (2015) definition is doubtless broader and is adopted here to permit a holistic 
view of tourism on China’s border. 
 
Yet, when it comes to the role of tourism in border-making, research remains scarce. 
This is not surprising as a static view of the border as “lines” limits the depth and scope 
of examining the impact of tourism on the border. Timothy, Guia, and Berthet (2014), 
for example, propose a typology of tourism-induced changes to borders, including 
subsequent tourism, wrapping of a resource, heritagisation of borders, modification of 
infrastructure, and territorial exchange. The focal point of this typology, however, is 
still the physical border. In this respect, more recent studies (e.g., Rowen, 2014; 
Timothy et al., 2016) are calling for a shift towards the bordering perspective. 
 
The bordering perspective re-orients attention from border per se to the process of the 
multi-scalar production of borders as being socially constructed (Newman, 2006).Yet, 
“the term bordering does not imply a specific trend (towards opening or closure) but 
refers to all the practices (from everyday life to high geopolitics and geo-economics) 
that relate to the continuous making and remaking of borders” (Herzog & Sohn, 2017, 
p. 5). Two associated bordering dynamics are de-bordering and re-bordering, which not 
only contest each other, but also interact and co-mingle. De-bordering signifies the 
“opening of a border, the disabling of controls or the blurring of the differences between 
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social and spatial entities and the mental categories associated to them”; Re-bordering, 
however, highlights the “controlling of movements and flows and the construction of 
categories and distinctions that structure social and spatial divisions” (Herzog & Sohn, 
2017, p. 5).  
 
Indeed, one can find some evidences from extant literature regarding the relevance of 
tourism and bordering. On the one hand, it is argued that de-bordering and re-bordering 
at macro-level (a state-centric perspective) has a profound impact on border tourism 
development. One notable example is in Mansfeld and Korman’s (2015) conceptual 
model regarding conflict-heritage tourism in border areas where the level of 
development is mainly dependent on border permeability as determined by the relations 
existing between nation-states. On the other hand, several empirical tourism studies at 
micro-level (borderland-centric perspective) have implicated the potential role of 
tourism in the bordering process. For example, Russian second-home development in 
the Finnish borderland was partly enabled by the liberation of Finnish–Russian border 
after the Soviet Union’s collapse. Hannonen (2017) states this reinforced the symbolism 
and mental distance of the Finnish-Russian border among Finnish borderlanders as 
Russian owners were “othered”. Prokkola’s (2010) study, however, argued that cross-
border co-cooperative tourism development on the Finnish-Swedish border 
significantly contributed to the reorganization of border landscape and dissolution of 
mental boundaries in the region.  
 
Tourism as an agent of border-making: An analytical framework  
With a process-based understanding of borders, border scholarship, essentially drawing 
on the insights of Henri Lefebvre, has highlighted the social production of border space 
(Rossiter, 2011), which can be a useful starting point to capture the “processual” 
interactions between tourism and border construction. Within this spatial approach, 
border can be viewed through three interdependent and inter-reactive moments of space 
– the conceived, perceived, and lived (Dean, 2005). The conceived dimension considers 
how the border is represented by those in power. Hence, state discourse and 
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representation related to the border continue to play a critical role in structuring border 
realities (Brunet-Jailly, 2005). Yet one must point out that the state is not a homogenous 
entity, and that authorities at different levels are not necessarily consistent with each 
other in regards to the border (Kraudzun, 2017). Market forces are another major factor 
in terms of tourism, and representation of the border translates to the industry’s 
construction of the border as well as tourists’ imagination of the border (Su, 2010).  
 
The lived dimension is about everyday life at the border, which is directly and 
significantly affected by proximity to the boundary. While the dominant forces try to 
shape border realities through corresponding discourses and practices, borderlanders 
are never passive actors. Instead, their agency, resistance, contestation etc. form a 
significant discourse in recent border scholarship as shaping new social understandings 
of the border (Singh, 2014). To interrogate how tourism might shape the everyday life 
at the border, three lenses can be drawn from extant literature. The first is the host-guest 
interaction that has been explored extensively in tourism (Aramberri, 2001). Second, 
the original social structure and relationships in the host communities might be affected 
by tourism, which then results in consequential impacts on the community’s daily 
experience (Weng, 2011). Last but not least, as the borderland is located between 
different nation-states by definition, the cross-border interaction (formal and informal) 
can be an integral part of border people’s everyday life (Ghosh, 2011) in which tourism, 
with its flows of people, goods, investment etc. across the border, clearly has a role.  
 
The perceived dimension draws attention to the production/consumption/regulation 
practices of various actors that result in physical border landscape (Frisvoll, 2013; 
Sofield, 2006), which is an observable manifestation of bordering practices and their 
impacts on a particular border (Johnson et al., 2011). Tourism clearly has a role in this 
aspect, notably demonstrated by the aforementioned typology of tourism-induced 
changes to borders. An analytic framework is thus established to unravel the border-
making agency of tourism (Figure 1). It allows a nuanced examination of the interaction 
and mutual constitution of structure and agency in tourism border-making process, 
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avoiding the simple top-down vis-à-vis bottom-up models of hegemony/structure and 
resistance/agency towards border(ing). 
 
Figure 1 Tourism border-making: An analytic framework  
 
THE CASE- DALUO ON THE XISHUANGBANNA-MYANMAR 
BORDER 
Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture, located in Southwest China’s Yunnan 
province, bordering Myanmar and Lao, is among the best-known tourist destinations in 
China. Covering an area of 19,124.5 square kilometers, and colloquially known as 
Banna, the prefecture comprises three administrative subdivisions, namely Menghia 
county in the west, Jinghong city (county-level city) in the center, and Mengla county 
in the east. With a resident population of 1,164,000 at the end of 2015, the prefecture is 
home to 13 officially recognized ethnic groups. The ethnic minorities account for 77.6% 
of the registered population, while Han Chinese account for 22.4% (Government of 




Tourism in Banna started in the early 1980s and Banna was listed as one of forty-four 
national-level scenic sites by the Chinese government in 1982 (Yang, Wall, & Smith, 
2008). In general, the area has been known for its ethnic minorities (notably Dai), 
tropical environment, and border landscape. The domestic tourism market is mainly 
Han Chinese from developed areas of China, notably the provinces of East China, while 
a small international market comprises tourists from Southeast Asia, mostly Thai (Bi & 
Yang, 2017; Yang et al., 2008). As shown in Figure 2, the tourism market grew rapidly 
in the 1990s, followed by a period of stagnation in the early 2000s. That stagnation was 
mainly caused by a series of underlying issues in local tourism planning and 
management (Yang et al., 2008), for which the huiyong trend (the commission-oriented 
behaviors and operations among tour guides, travel agencies, tourism enterprises 
managing tourist sites, and souvenir businesses) was greatly blamed for impairing 
tourists’ experience and damaging the image of Banna. Following reforms as described 
below, tourism has become a pillar of the local economy for some years, annually 
contributing over 60% to the regional GDP (Bi & Yang, 2017). 
 
 
Figure 2 Annual tourist arrival in Banna (1985–2016) 
Source : Banna Tourism Administration  
 
The border tourism program in Banna formally started in 1992 covering the China-


































area. However, tourist flows in the borderlands of China and its neighbors is mainly 
unidirectional, with mostly Chinese tourists visiting these areas, even in Hong Kong 
and Macau. Tourist flows in the above mentioned borderlands once accounted for over 
two thirds of the total border tourists in Yunnan province, making Banna an important 
border tourism region in China (Center for Tourism Planning and Research of Sun Yat-
sen University & Banna Tourism Administration, 2003). However, at the end of 2004, 
the border tourism program in Yunnan, and later nationwide, was suspended for Chinese 
citizens, which remained so for most parts of China’s borders till 2013 with the 
exceptions of the special administrative regions.  
 
The Daluo-Mongla border (see Figure 3) constitutes a focal point for this paper because: 
(a) Tourism there has long been more popular and has a more overt presence than in 
similar areas of ethnic minorities; (b) Tourism there has been a major force for social 
change (Li, 2009); (c) Tourism there is considered as emblematic of China’s border 
tourism development (Li, 2014; Xie, 2005), and the fact that indigenous peoples there 
(e.g., Dai, Bulang, Hani) straddle the national border is common in Asian borderlands 
(Van Schendel & De Maaker, 2014) as in Xinjiang; (d) It is at the border crossings that 
the different forces of bordering dynamics are most vibrant (Herzog & Sohn, 2017), 
and hence the entanglement of tourism and bordering is more observable there.  
 





The study adopted an ethnographic approach and data were collected via four months’ 
fieldwork by the first author in four consecutive years: July-August 2014, October-
November 2015, March-April 2016 and June-July 2017. The months were spent living 
with a Dai family in a tourist village, and researching in the Daluo-Mongla border 
crossing area, yet occasionally traveling to Menghai county town and Jinghong to 
interview respondents there.  
 
This meant that the first author entered into a social pattern different to the space he 
normally occupies, which, according to Ryan (2012), requires more intense periods of 
learning. It should be noted that the second author also has some familiarity of the area. 
This process supported a micro-level analysis of everyday life at the border, an 
advantage of the ethnographic approach to research (Fetterman, 2010). In fact, Dean 
(2012) argues, ethnographic study is the only way to research borderlands as “lived 
spaces challenged and inspired” by international boundaries. 
 
First-hand data were collected via observation, conversation and interviews. In-depth 
interviews were conducted with four government officials from the prefecture to the 
county to the town level, whose expertise in border management or/and (border) 
tourism ranged from 11 to 30 years. Initial analysis of government policies, documents, 
and planning materials related to border and tourism was also conducted to help the 
first author familiarize himself with the context as well as raising questions for the 
interviews. The officials were then purposefully contacted via the authors’ personal 
networks. Each was interviewed at least twice and were willing to share their abundant 
knowledge of local government policies and practices concerning (border) tourism. All 
were recorded and later transcribed. 
 
Forty-four indigenous villagers were interviewed (Table 1). A snowballing sampling 
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was adopted, as it proved to be the quickest way to gain respondents’ trust. The fact that 
Dai villager respondents accounted for the largest percent can be justified as follows: 
(a) The border crossing is located at the Daluo administrative village (33.95 km2) where 
10 out of the 13 villages are Dai villages, the other three being one Bulang village, one 
Hani village, and one migrant village; and (b) Dai live in the lowlands, and are more 
involved in tourism compared to upland Bulang and Hani people. In the upland villages, 
purposeful conversational approaches were adopted. For those 
interviews/conversations with indigenous ethnic minorities, questions usually related 
to local history, ethnic culture, personal history, livelihood, cross-border interaction and 
attitudes towards tourism. These interviews (often repeated) were usually conducted in 
villagers’ homes, and it often happened that while interviewing a respondent, family 
members and friends who had dropped in would join the conversation, making the 




Table 1 The socio-demographic characteristics of the indigenous villager sample 




Tourism employees 7 
  Self-employed in tourism 13 
Female 14 Agriculture-related livelihoods 24 
Age 
Middle 10s to 30s 26 
Ethnicity 
Dai 35 
40s-50s 13 Bulang 6 
60s and above 5 Hani 3 
 
Twenty-one migrants were also interviewed, including fourteen migrant 
villagers/workers/businessmen, four tourism managers, and three investors, and 
nineteen of these interviews were recorded. Moreover, three high ranking Dai Buddhist 
monks in the town, four respondents from the tourism industry from out of town and 
one tourism researcher with expertise in the area were also interviewed. Five were 
recorded. The interviews were semi-structured but tailored to suit particular individuals 
12 
 
and sometimes altered contingent on the lines of conversation and current events. 
 
Field notes were taken during interviews or immediately after interviews or 
conversations in notebooks. Moreover, research notes were taken reflecting thinking 
about the research. In total, 43 research notes were written, totaling 35,000 words in 
Chinese. Numerous second-hand data were collected for data triangulation, including 
policy and planning reports issued by various levels of governments, plus industry 
marketing materials, news reports, online travelogues and academic literature. The 
second author also independently raised data for formal governmental reporting. 
 
Both descriptive and thematic coding was used to analyze the data. First, all transcripts 
were printed out and then read word by word, open codes and notes were written in the 
blank space while certain words or sentences were highlighted. Meanwhile, the 
respondents’ personal history was summarized on a case-by-case basis. Second, NVivo 
11 was used to analyze the data. Again, the transcripts were read word by word, and 
coding undertaken to identity information with reference to major aspects of the 
framework. Third, the coded quotations were again referenced to the research and field 
notes, to identify themes. Last but not least, communication was maintained with key 
respondents via WeChat to double check the analysis. 
 
Finally, in reporting the findings, the various conversational and textual data are 
synthesized to develop a number of themes instead of each informant being treated as 
being ontologically separate (Lamb, 2014). Ethnographic highlights are identified to 
harness frictional relationships (Tsing, 2005) to uncover the multi-scalar tourism 
border-making process. Due to the limitation of space, quotations are selected on the 
basis of their illustrative value for the larger tendencies embedded in the data. Three 
evolutionary periods of bordering are proposed.  
FINDINGS  
Tourism development on the border  
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Phase one:  
The rapid growth of organized cross-border tourist flow (1991-2001) 
After the formation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the borders were kept 
tightly closed to prevent outside influences from entering China, which situation 
remained until the 1980s (Eng, 2000). From the middle 1980s, gaining momentum from 
the China’s “Opening-up” and the decentralization of decision-making permitting 
border provinces more discretionary powers, the borders were gradually opened up as 
the provincial and local governments encouraged cross-border trading to boost 
economic development (Liu & Lia, 1993). In Banna, border tourism was initiated by 
local authorities as early as 1991 as an economic development tool. A prefecture official 
commented:  
 
At that time, we initiated tourism for borderland residents as the breakthrough for 
tourism, we didn’t construct it for tourists, and the certificate for the traveling was 
border people pass... The border tourism was promoted from the bottom to the top. 
To be more specific, it’s our innovative way to develop borderland economy. Not 
violating state policy, we somewhat “played edge ball”, launched [border tourism] 
in the form of border trade. 
 
With China’s “opening-up” and consequent rapid economic growth, overseas travel 
became financially accessible for an emerging middle-upper class in the 1990s (Wang 
& Sheldon, 1996), having previously been severely restricted. In fact, it was not until 
1997 with the issue of the Provisional Regulation on Self-supported Outbound Travel 
by Beijing that self-supported outbound leisure travel was formally started. Before then, 
outbound tours were mostly for business, friends and relatives visits, often associated 
with restrictions such as overseas family friends having to pay the costs of travel. 
Moreover, there were few outbound tourism destinations to choose with the Approved 
Destination Status (ADS) system established relaxing restrictions on outbound tourism 
market but retaining control by creating a regulatory need for visa approval (Arlt, 2013). 
Indeed by the end of 1999, mainland Chinese were permitted to visit only nine ADS 
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countries for tourist purposes (China National Tourism Administration, 2016).  
 
It was against this backdrop that border tourism program had an appeal as a form of 
overseas travel. As the prefecture official pointed out, “In the past, the country was not 
that open, if you could travel overseas, people would think that’s extraordinary.” This 
is also reflected in an early government report: Domestic tourist is a magnificent source 
market for Banna, as long as Banna increases tourism facilities, further develops 
border tourism, it can attract more domestic tourists (Economy and Technology 
Research Center of Yunnan Provincial Government, 1993, para.20). According to 
statistics issued by the Mongla authorities, the tourist numbers for the China-Myanmar 
border tourism program grew from around 2,000 in 1991 to 207,221 in 1994 to 593,740 
in 1999 (Center for Tourism Planning and Research of Sun Yat-sen University & Banna 
Tourism Administration, 2003). 
 
Reflecting this growth, the Menghai county government established the Daluo 
Economic Development Zone, commonly known as the China-Myanmar Street, right 
on the border with land confiscated from local villagers. After the government built the 
road and other infrastructure, plots of land were then sold to outside investors. Seeing 
the business opportunities, Han migrants from the inland soon flocked to the border 
town, among whom Hunanese and Sichuanese accounted for the largest part. This was 
due to historical links as during the 1950s and 1960s Hunanese migration to Banna was 
mobilized by the state to “Support the Construction of Socialism in the Borderland”, 
and in the 1960s and 1970s large numbers of Sichuanese “educated youth” were also 
sent to Banna. The Han migrants soon dominated tourism building hotels, tourist 
restaurants, souvenir shops, travel agencies, border trade or even businesses providing 
for the necessities of daily life (e.g., fashion, and hardware stores). This in turn left the 
ethnic minorities with smaller service functions (e.g., food vendors) and low-end 
service jobs (e.g., waitresses and cleaners). However, some of the ethnic minorities took 
advantage of their land use rights by renting land to investors for tourist development. 
For instance, one former village official (Dai, 60s) recalled hosting a Beijing investor 
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in 1995:   
 
I didn’t know him in the beginning, he was introduced … by his friends. I was the 
village official then, advertising that we had the forest and wanted to develop it, 
and that whoever wanted to invest here would be welcomed and could do what 
he/she wanted. You know, we didn’t have money so I needed to find money.    
      
Inevitably inconsistencies between central policies and actual practices emerged. For 
instance, while the Beijing government demanded that border tourism tourists be 
limited to residents of the border province itself, in practice border tourism involved 
tourists from a much broader region and even nationwide in some cases (Zhang, 1996). 
In Yunnan, the tourist market was opened to provide for tourists from outside the 
Province (Yunnan Provincial Tourism Administration & Yunnan Provincial Public 
Security Department, 1993). Thus, one informant who once worked as a tour guide in 
the town, recalled: 
 
Informant: It was chaotic at that time [in 1999]. The border pass was hand-written, 
it was not linked to the internet. As a tour guide, I even took tourists from Taiwan, 
Japan, and Korea to Mongla, just fabricating a Chinese ID number (laugh). 
Author: Could these people pass the port? 
Informant: Yes, you know, they looked like Chinese. Just fabricated a Chinese ID 
number, no photo was needed. The tour guide would take the list to border police 
and then crossed the border, it was somewhat chaotic.   
 
It was in this stage that the border gained economic value, while an “othering” process 
occurred between local indigenous on both sides of the border and Han migrants. 
 
Phase two:  
Stagnation and collapse of formal tourism sectors yet emerging illegal cross-
border tourist flow (2002-2011)  
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Since 2000 Chinese outbound tourism experienced extraordinary growth due to China’s 
continuing economic growth and further loosening of controls on outbound tourism 
(Tse & Hobson, 2008). This, in turn, adversely affected the popularity of border tourism 
program as a form of overseas travel, as reflected in Figure 4. A steady decrease in 
tourist numbers for the border tourism program was undoubtedly observed in Banna 
around the early 2000s (Center for Tourism Planning and Research of Sun Yat-sen 
University & Banna Tourism Administration, 2003).  
 
 
Figure 4  Three types of Chinese outbound tourism organized by travel agencies 
(2000-2015) 
Note: Statistics of official border tour have not been published since 2010 
Source: China National Tourism Administration 
 
Meanwhile, what might be termed “vice tourism” based on casinos, prostitution and 
even drugs emerged in the borderlands of China’s neighbors in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, notably the borderlands of Myanmar and Vietnam along China's southwestern 
border as well these of Russia and North Korea along China’s northeastern border 
(Xinhua Net, 2005; Yi, 2003). This catered to Chinese vice-seekers, including corrupt 
government officials and state-owned enterprise managers (Yi, 2003). Indeed, when 
casinos first opened in Mongla in 1998, several casinos also opened on the Chinese side, 
to which the local authorities somewhat turned a blind eye. The casinos were then 














implemented (a town official, interviewed in November 2015). Then, when the vice 
sectors on the Chinese side were forced to shut down, investors simply moved their 
businesses to Mongla. In its heyday (2004), there were 56 casinos, big and small, in 
Mongla (Fujimura, 2013). This in turn contributed to an increase in the cross-border 
flow of Chinese vice-seekers, Mongla turning into a “vice town” with gambling, 
prostitution and drugs.  
  
 
The rampant cross-border gambling wave at China’s border soon attracted the attention 
of Beijing. In Yunnan, as early as May 2003, in response to Beijing’s deployment, the 
Yunnan provincial government launched the special “Sword Action” to combat cross-
border gambling. In 2004 and 2005, when a nationwide crackdown was deployed by 
Beijing, the border tourism program was initially suspended in Yunnan in December 
2004. Yet the Yunnan government did not halt it entirely for fear of adverse effects on 
its economy, and it remained available to provincial residents. According to several 
government informants, it was not until September 2005 that Kunming halted all border 
tourism programs as the prior policy was not effective and was potentially attracting 
Beijing’s attention. This closure led to a sudden collapse of the formal tourism sectors, 
not only in the Daluo-Mongla border area, but also the whole of Menghai county. The 
was not surprising as the area had long relied on Mongla for its tourism, ignoring its 
own destination building, as commented upon by official and industry respondents. And 
throughout the process, local Chinese governments frequently appealed to Beijing to 
resume the program because of the loss of tourism revenues.  
 
With the official border crossing closed for Chinese tourists but remaining open for 
registered residents of Banna, illegal crossings flourished as a means for outsiders, 
mostly gamblers, to enter Mongla. As no natural barriers form the border, local villagers, 
especially those from villages close to the borderline, helped visitors enter Mongla via 
various small tracks using motorbikes. Indeed, several villages even established routes 
for illegal border crossing and would charge “customers” for watching out for border 
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police, though this practice ceased in 2016 after police raids. The business was 
profitable and reached a relatively large scale, as verified by various informants’ 
comments. Yet again, local relevant state agencies, to some degree, turned a blind eye 
to the practice, albeit with occasional short-run crackdowns. In turn, some officials were 
bribed by villagers for exercising a “kind” tolerance. Villagers frequently mentioned 
this local corruption and it was also confirmed by official informants.  
During this stage the bordering process exhibited tensions between official dictate and 
local realities, but overtime an increased regulatory practice became the norm, 
reinforcing the authority of local and central governments. 
 
Phase three:  
Resurrection and transition of border tourism (2012-present) 
In the second decade of the twenty-first century, casinos have less presence on China’s 
neighboring borders. The casinos in Mongla town were closed, though some 
subsequently reopened, but further inland, about 20 km from the border; the casinos in 
Boten on the Laos-China border were all shut down by 2011, with some investors 
shifting their attention to the Laos-Thailand border (Nyíri, 2012). Moreover, Beijing 
actively sought regional cooperation with neighboring countries, as illustrated by the 
One Belt, One Road Initiative, and cross-border tourism initiatives are encouraged. This 
is reflected by changes in terminology being used in various recent governmental policy 
and planning documents: The term “border tourism” is increasingly accompanied or 
even replaced by “cross-border tourism”. Table 2 offers a typical example. 
Table 2 Word frequency of border tourism related terms in Yunnan provincial five-
year tourism plans 
Term 11th  five-year (2006-2010)  
plan issued in 2005 
12th  five-year 
(2011-2015) plan 
released in 2011 
13th  five-year (2016-
2020) plan 
published in 2016 
Border  12 7 62 
Border tourism   8 3 33 
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Cross-border tourism  5 8 88 
Border cross-border tourism 0 0 4 
Cross-border  border tourism  0 0 5 
Cross-nation tourism   2 5 10 
Regional tourism cooperation  7 4 26 
While the border tourism program was approved by Beijing to resume nationwide in 
2013, it no longer had the appeal of earlier years, either in Banna or elsewhere on 
China’s borders (Li, 2014). As one prefecture official commented: “Now border 
tourism business is not as good as it was before, many people travel abroad with 
passports and are not interested in the border tour, as for travel agencies, it’s not really 
that useful to obtain the designation, so they just don’t apply for it.” In Banna the local 
authorities shifted their focus from Mongla to Daluo, with an emphasis now on ethnicity 
and rurality.  
 
Two features of the redevelopment can be observed. On the one hand, local government 
seeks to attract large companies with large projects and investments to boost tourism (a 
county official, interviewed in April 2016). On the other hand, there has been active 
government intervention in local tourism according to official informants, be it 
distinctive rural tourism village projects financed by Yunnan provincial government, 
accelerated infrastructure construction, or the introduction of state-owned enterprise 
such as Golden Peacock Tourism Group1. As indicated in Figure 5, the redevelopment 
has achieved some success in attracting visitors. 
  
 
                                                             
1 Golden Peacock Tourism Group, dating back to the middle 1990s, is the largest tour company 
initially established by an enterprise controlled by Han interests from Zhejiang Province in East 
China. In 2009, however, 66% of its shares were purchased by Yunnan Tourism Investment Group 




Figure 5 Tourist numbers of Mengjinglai Scenic Site, Daluo 
Note: Menjinglai, a cultural park based on a Dai village that presents Dai culture since 2004, is a 
must-see site in Daluo, thereby its visitor number reflecting the trend of tourism development in the 
town.   
 
Tourism development as a re-bordering force   
Materialization of the border  
It was not until 1960 that a boundary treaty was signed between China and Myanmar 
that formalized a border between the two countries (Fan, 2010). Yet few artificial 
boundary markers were erected, as recalled by villagers, as tall trees, big rocks, and 
rivers were used as markers. Locals were free to cross the border, and border crossing 
formalities were few. Indeed, there was little need at the Daluo-Mongla border, as the 
ban on border trade as well as its remoteness meant little demand for cross-broder traffic 
until the advent of tourism. 
 
With the development of trade and tourism, things changed. On the one hand, the 
emerging cross-border flows prompted Chinese state to enhance control and filtering 
measures, reinforcing a grounded interpretation of “the border”. For instance, against 
the background of China’s “opening-up” of the border in the early 1990s, a second joint 











markers were built, as was the case on the Daluo-Mongla border in 1993. In Yunnan, 
commencing in 1992, borderland residents were required to apply for PRC exit and 
entry permits for legal crossing via “border port”. As Mongla had been the focus of 
development and was more prosperous than Daluo, it increasingly became the business, 
retail and entertainment center for the border region. That was reinforced by investment 
in roading infrastructure.  
 
Despite this, village residents maintained they continued to illegally use traditional 
“small tracks” for border crossing until the early 2000s when the crackdown on cross-
border gambling began between China and Myanmar in earnest. This was evidenced 
by troops being again sent to Daluo in 2003 after previously being  withdrawn in the 
middle 1980s (a border official, interviewed in June 2017), in common with other parts 
of China’s borders (Yu, 2014). An army border patrol was established, and border 
fences and observation towers were built by the Chinese authorities. Locals involved in 
the illegal border crossing business have been increasingly monitored and punished. In 
compensation, initiatives are being explored to involve locals in border management 
and control. One example is the involvement of Yunnan Tourism Investment 
Group/Golden Peacock Company in promoting a grassroots Party organization on the 
border as envisaged by the provincial government. The first Alliance Party workstation 
in Banna comprising local border police, the enterprise and the village was established 
at Mengjinglai in 2017. 
 
On the other hand, “signing” the border per se as a tourist attraction is a common 
practice on the ground, promoting the “visibility” of the abstract borderline. Border 
facilities, such official crossing points and boundary markets, have long become tourist 
attractions. Moreover, various tourism-oriented places or activities that refer to the 
border also act as an active reminder of the existence of the border, like “The First 
Village on China Myanmar Border” and “China-Myanmar Border River Rafting”. To 




Socio-economic integration of borderlanders  
While tourism initially marginalized local communities, the development of it was 
linked with other initiatives, notably with banana and rubber plantations. These have 
significantly involved local residents to their economic advantage. When rubber 
planting was initiated in the 1950s in Banna, it was mainly limited to state-farms 
dominated by Han migrants. In the 1980s local authorities started to encourage ethnic 
minorities to plant rubber for economic development. It was then on a small scale, but 
that changed in the 1990s and 2000s when outside investors expanded it on a much 
larger scale (a town official, interviewed in April 2016). Banana plantations were 
primarily initiated by outside investors in the early 2000s. The main plantation investors 
are Hunanese and Sichuanese, so verifying the strong link between the general influx 
of outsiders and the inter-relationship between tourism development and development 
of banana plantation. An interdependence between tourism and the plantation industry 
exists in that both are facilitated by and justify State infrastructure development. 
Equally, each could compensate the other in the case of a downgrading of business in 
one of the two. The following typifies the relationship. 
 
Case: M6, 38, is a Han migrant from Kunming, Yunnan. He came to work in 
Daluo as a tour guide in 1998. When the official border tour was suspended, he 
lost the job. Yet feeling attached to Daluo, he did not leave Daluo. Instead, he 
chose to stay in Daluo and work for banana plantation and learned the related 
techniques. Then in 2009, he started to rent land to start his own banana 
plantation. In the beginning, it was 60 mu (1 mu=0.0667 hectare) land, by 2017 
it has increased to up to 500 mu land. Yet his story is not unique. Indeed, as far 
as he knows, there are several others who very successfully shifted from tourism 
to agriculture after the tourism suspension. After the official border tour was 
resumed, he also started to work with the Golden Peacock Company. He now 
has a team of four to market the cross-border tour for the company, mainly 




The rapid development of cash crop plantation raised land rents, which, in turn, 
provided the indigenous people greater opportunities based on their land usage rights. 
While initially employed by the outside (Han) investors, some are now becoming 
employers of the new migrants attracted to the banana plantations in recent years. The 
following is not untypical (interview with a Dai villager, 20s, in November 2015): 
 
Author:   Now people here don’t grow rice. 
Villager:  We usually rent our land out for banana plantations. Now my 
family has taken the land back and grow bananas by ourselves. 
Author:  Grow it by yourselves, so you have the skills? 
Villager:  No, we employ others to do it. There are people who can plant 
and look after bananas. Give them some commission and let them 
look after it. 
 
For the indigenous border communities, the transition from traditional sightseeing tour 
groups toward more independent and experience-seeking travelers in recent years 
(Banna Tourism Administration & Monitoring Center for UNWTO Sustainable 
Tourism Observatories, 2015) has meant that they can bypass intermediaries in parts of 
a distribution chain currently dominated by Han investors. One recent and visible 
phenomenon is the emergence of ethnic restaurants and accommodations operated by 
locals. Often the initiatives are supported by State interventions in business skill 
education, training and field trips, or the provision of direct financial allocation for 
facilities and infrastructure improvement.   
 
One consequence is that many enterprises now stress benefit sharing with local ethnic 
minority communities (research note, June 21, 2017). Notably, in 2015, partly with the 
help from local government, villagers of Mengjinglai even managed to abolish the 
previous compensation system agreed in its 50-year-fixed contract signed with the 
Golden Peacock Tourism Group in the early 2000s. At that time the village was anxious 
to attract investment and accepted a fixed, low compensation for hosting tourism. The 
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village now has the right to share 8% of the ticket income, which is to rise to 12 % in 
2020. 
 
With the establishment of the Banna prefecture, Dai ruling privileges were abolished 
and all ethnic groups had equal legal rights. Yet on the ground, the old ranking order 
survived the changes, as the Dai’s lowland position facilitated their agricultural 
production and later involvement in the market economy in the Reform era (Kui, 1997). 
However, with increased Han immigration, the privileged position of Dai seems to have 
been eroded as the incoming Han generally have advantages in education, language, 
capital, and employment history. Additionally, the emerging rubber economy favored 
the hill tribes who generally manage much of the hill land suitable for rubber plantations, 
as noted:  
 
Several years ago, rubber price was 35 RMB a half kilo. When shopping, 
Bulang people took big bags of cash, whilst we Dai used really small ones. Each 
Bulang household has several thousand rubber trees, each day they earned one 
to two thousand RMB, we only earned several dozens (An old Dai villager). 
 
Accordingly, the hierarchical social structure of Dai being privileged and upland ethnic 
groups being subordinate, has largely dissolved. Another factor is the increasing 
popularity of ethnic intermarriage, notably the Han-ethnic minority marriages. Thus, as 
local socio-economic lives are integrated into the Chinese nation-state and more 
importantly, as the ethnic minorities visibly benefit from such integration, a sense of 
belonging and pride associated with China has been greatly enhanced.  
 
The “othering” of Mongla  
A trip to another country is often motivated by curiosity, and a desire to seek new things. 
As one Dai villager commented, “Tourists wanted to cross the border to travel overseas. 
There was no point for a tourist coming here without traveling overseas.” In this 
instance the Banna tourism industry emphasized and even purposefully created 
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differences in Mongla. Many of these were features “imported” from other parts of 
Myanmar or other Southeast Asian countries, including long neck people, big ear 
people, and Thai ladyboys. Another notable example is that while local minorities on 
the Chinese side still refers to Burmese Dai people on the Burmese side as Dai, the 
industry brochures used the nomenclature “Shan”, the official ethnic appellation of the 
Burmese government. On the ground, this differentiation enhanced the idea of “them” 
as “Myanmar” separated from local Dai by the border.  
 
From the viewpoint of particularly local Han, what changed their view of Mongla was 
the growth of its vice sectors. When asked, locals often referred to prostitution, 
gambling and drugs, depicting Mongla as a place of vice where anything goes and a 
place to avoid. This perception reinforced notions that the border should be tightly 
controlled to stop the flow of vice, notably drugs, across the border from Mongla. Given 
that the vice was associated with a sense of chaos, crime, corruption, and even 
lawlessness that led to a common belief that “we” have a better socio-political 
environment than “them”. Such a differential contributed to a wider discourse in 
relation to a “modern” and stable China vis-à-vis a “backward” and chaotic Myanmar. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
Drawing on the dynamics of border tourism development and China’s broad political 
economic evolution, one can trace shifting power relationships between the Chinese 
state, market forces and border communities across the three phases.  
 
At phase one, with decentralization of state power, fiscal policy reform and the 
establishment of the socialist market economy, local governments were motivated to 
pursue fiscal income maximization (Oi, 1995). For Beijing, the post-Tiananmen Square 
policies were driven by the necessity to grow the Chinese economy to maintain political 
support and legitimacy (Cornet, 2012). In turn, border tourism innovation from the 
bottom was promoted by the central government as a strategy to reduce regional 
development differences and stabilize the periphery of the State. Local government 
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actively sought to attract outside business and investment, and local governments and 
private market forces became the dominant players for socio-economic development in 
the borderland. At this stage indigenous communities were marginalized mainly due to 
a lack of capital and market linkage. Indeed, the principle of “whoever invests, whoever 
develops, is the one to profit” was adopted by the Yunnan’s tourism administrators at 
this period (Donaldson, 2007).    
 
Over time, with the emergence of negative tourism impacts including the prominent 
growth of vice sectors and illegal cross-border flows, the Chinese state responded with 
tighter regulations to avert the undermining of state stability and security. This led to a 
decline of private market operations along with Beijing’s growth of control over the 
socio-economic development of the border. This was, in the broader context, consistent 
with Beijing’s drive to re-centralize power included political reforms aimed at 
strengthening its control of lower-level cadres at the turn of the twenty-first century 
(Edin, 2003). However, the border communities, making the most of their being on the 
border and their guanxi with local state institutions on the ground, initially maintained 
the illegal tourist flow; while the later development of plantations benefited from the 
tourism infrastructure. In turn this subsequently empowered the indigenous people 
based on their land usage rights. To this end, a partial power shift occurred that favored 
local communities and the national state.  
 
At phase three, following Xi Jinping's assumption of the Party leadership after the 18th 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China, there has been a new phase of 
political re-centralization, seeing recentralized decision-making and strengthened 
central control (Kostka & Nahm, 2017). Notably, tolerance for local action is 
constrained when it is linked to corruption. Meanwhile, the state has adopted a 
community-centric economic and social development program (Blaxland, Shang, & 
Fisher, 2013). These programs have been enacted since 2000 under the “Program to 
Develop Border Areas and Improve the Lives of the People There”, and further 
supported with the launch of the One Belt, One Road Initiative (State Council of China, 
27 
 
2017). For the border communities, these socio-economic-political changes have 
enabled minorities to better participate in and benefit from the development on the 
border.  
 
Consequently, what has accompanied the tourism development is a continuous growth 
of a contested-tensioned state power over the borderlands in general, particularly where 
non-Han populations are numerous. For national government, the border, whether 
closed or open, operates as a barrier to ensure state security as stability is the priority 
for Beijing, whereas, for local jurisdictions, a different discourse is premised on an open 
border as an economic resource. For the tourism market forces, the border is a line of 
difference to be utilized in destination marketing and a line to be crossed to experience 
an imagined “other”. For the indigenous communities, the border can be a socio-
economic resource for wanted or unwanted cross-border flows. In the tourism 
development process, each stakeholder has sought to utilize the border for their own 
purposes, leading to a boundary on the map becoming a reality in the practices and 
imaginations of borderland dwellers, and as a material and mental border between “us” 
and “them”. Therefore, the tourism development involves a “re-bordering” of the border. 
At first glance, this interpretation of the Chinese experience appears to contradict 
policy-makers’ assumption of (cross)border tourism as a de-bordering force, facilitating 
openness and eroding barrier effects of border, such in the Europe Union (Prokkola, 
2010) and Greater Mekong Subregion (Sofield, 2006). This seeming contradiction, in 
fact, illustrates the importance of scale in understanding border (ing) (Novak, 2016). In 
this study, on a macro-level, de-bordering appears to be the mainstream following 
China’s opening-up of its borders at phase one, while re-bordering seems to be the trend 
with nationwide suspension of border tourism and tightening control over the border at 
phase two, followed by de-bordering with the One Belt, One Road Initiative at phase 
three. Yet, on the ground it is re-bordering across the three stages.   
Conventional studies of liminal regions indicate that tourism development in ethnic 
minority areas led by state intervention in alliance with capital results in the  
marginalization of ethnic minorities (Yang et al., 2008; Zhu, Jin, & Graburn, 2017). 
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However, there is a need to consider temporal aspects, and in China what was true even 
a decade ago is less valid today given the rate of change. China is a dynamic social 
process, and tourism is part of that process. This study suggests that while initially 
bypassed by the cross-border tourist flow, the minority communities are increasingly 
able to participate in and benefit from tourism in the twenty-first century due to 
structural changes in socio-economic and political environments. Hence, they derive 
power from the centralized pro-poverty and ethnic minority policies of Beijing to 
counteract local pro-economic predispositions of local jurisdictions. 
 
This study thus makes several contributions to the literature: (a) It develops an 
analytical framework to capture tourism border-making and applies it to a Chinese 
border tourism context. It thus contributes to the understudied tourism and bordering 
nexus (Rowen, 2014; Timothy et al., 2016), which is of significance to tourism studies 
and border studies, and establishes a link between the two; (b) It describes the changing 
power relations among stakeholders to contribute to the understanding of the realpolitik 
in China’s borderland from a tourism borderlands perspective, addressing the previous 
lack of attention to power relations (Stoffelen et al., 2017), and (c) responds to the call 
for more longitudinal research in China (Li, Ryan, & Cave, 2016) regarding tourism 
development in China’s ethnic minority areas. 
 
Borderlands are a nexus of differentiation, where each of the stakeholders impute 
differing meanings of the role of the border. For tourists it is emblematic of journey into 
different cultures, for local ethnic minorities it is a disruption of family structures and 
an imposition on traditional lifestyles. For local administrations it represents a potential 
source of revenue and costs, for the tourism industry it is an attraction to be capitalized 
and for the State it is place to be patrolled and for the conduct of diplomatic 
relationships. Yet each of these possesses potential tensions wherein attitudes and 
policies may swing from one end of the pendulum to the other – from the open to the 
closed border, from an othering to the discovery of joint interests – and all the time the 
border retains a geo-political entity imposed on more diffuse socio-economic and 
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political processes. Finally, it is concluded that Kenichi Ohmae (1995, p. 11) assertion 
that “nation states have already lost their role as meaningful units of participation in 
the global economy of today’s borderless world” is however, not borne out by this 
example. Rather the border is de-territorialized to become a social political structure 
that retains importance.  
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